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Prof• Harald Hoffding, in "Problems of Philosophy", 
gives the four main problems of philosophy as: nature 
of consciousness, validity of knowledge, nature of being, 
and values. But he believes they may be tfeduced to one 
underlying problem, to be found *in the significence 
which the relation between continuity and discontinuity 
bears to each of these problemsThe establishment of 
a universal continuity, resting on identity, has been 
the dream of most philosophers, including Hoffding, who 
though hopeful finds the problem still unsolved. If man 
could leave himself out of the question it might be 
simplified. But as it is, man can never establish the 
continuity of the universe until he can establish the 
unity of his own nature. Here he meets two great 
difficulties, the mind-body problem, and the question 
of the unity of the mind. Hoffding wants to correlate 
the physiological series with the psychical, but sees 
the difficulty of correlating the first in which there 
is continuity with the second in which there is discon-
tinuity, at least apparently. There are numerous gaps 
or breaks in consciousness, which he nevertheless hopes 
will s#me''day' be filled with psychical terms. 
Ward says that if they are filled in it must be 
(2-r) 
done by turning to the subconscious, although he warns 
against making it a sort of catch-all for all that we 
cannot otherwise explain. There is a danger of consid-
ering a problem solved as soon as we have it named, 
but such tendency has been but little manifest in the 
search after the explanation of the unconscious. With 
out entering into a quarrel over terms, we can say that 
whether or not there be gaps in the psychical process, 
or in pure consciousness, there are at least gaps in 
the contents of conscious processes, unless, perchance, 
we choose to make the term consciousness universal, in 
which case there remain the gaps in the personal con-
sciousness, which amounts to the same thing as far as 
we are concerned. These are the breaks or gaps that 
the theories of the unconscious are trying to fill. Of 
these breaks we may distinguish three general broad 
classes, which will be but named here: the subconscious 
factors, (1) in attention, perception, memory, etc.; (2) 
in the connection and arrangement of the contents of 
consciousness; and (3) in amnesias, lapses of memory, 
double personalities. Under this come also instincts, 
» 
reflex acts, habits, etc., as a possible division of the 
subject. It is quite generally believed or assumed that 
the physical processes present an unbroken series. It 
(3-r) 
is possible, however, that we may -some d£y learn that 
such a statement is not true. 
It is not a solution of these problems to say that 
the psychical gaps are to be filled in with physical 
terms, nor to deny that they lie within the realm of 
psychology.xThfe purpose * of psychology is to establish 
the continuity of the processes with which it deals. 
Psychology must have as its goal the establishment of the 
continuity of the process which produces the so-called 
intellectual result, or else it is not properly named 
psychology. A psychical state either arises out of its 
own kind or else is produced by something else. There 
must be a 'cause', or a connecting link somewhere• So 
even though physiology and biology seduce many of our best 
psychologists to a field by no means barren, still that 
does not effect the solution of the problem at hand unless 
it be to strengthen the challenge. The gaps must be filled 
in. 
After a consideration of the necessity of filling 
in the gaps in the conscious mental processes, the 
perus.?l of such works as those of Prof. Jastrow or Dr. 
Prince, or a study of the work of the psychoanalysists, 
the student of the subjecj may begin to wonder why the 
subject is so much ignored by psychologists, especially 
(4) 
by those in America. He may be rather surprised to find 
Prof. Munsterberg opening a chapter in his "Psychotherapy" 
on the subconscious, with the sweeping statement that the 
"story of the subconscious may be told in three words, 
there is none". 
It therefore becomes clear that there is either a 
great misunderstanding, or a great diversity of opinion, 
or more probably a mixture of the two. In general three 
causes enter more or less in the rejection of the uncon-
scious by psychologists. 1. General mistrust and the 
suspicion of fraud, as of so ;e superstition, or some 
thinr supernatural. 2* Terminology, and 3. the assump-
tions and presuppositions which the different psychol-
ogists have taken as the starting point of their science. 
I. Many are prejudiced against the subconscious 
because of the unscientific method of many of those 
who use the terms most freely, such at least as the cruder 
spiritualists, psychical researchers, etc., who also often 
use many such terms as mental, conscious, unconscious, or 
subconscious, indiscriminately. Perhaps the height of 
this distrust is reached by Munsterberg, who says that he 
would not believe the things claimed as gacts by the 
Society of Psychical Research were he to see them with 
(5-r) 
his own eyes. Even if he could not detect any fraud or 
assign any other explanation, he demurs that he would be 
easily foole \ The sensationalists in general are very 
naturally as distrustful of the claims of the advocates 
of the wider mental realm as is Munsterberg, and we are 
compelled to say not without some reason. 
II. One half the difficulties James Ward believes 
"in the way of its (the subconscious) acceptance are due 
to our faulty terminology" (Ency. Rr.it. "Psy."). The 
confusion of tongues puts the problem on a plane with 
that confronting the children of Babel. There is no con-
sensus of opinion either of the word 'to be ufeed to 
designate the field of phenomena under discussion, or of 
the names to be assigned to the solutions offered for the 
problem. The confusion is doubled by the fact that we 
have generally fallen into the error of using the same 
word to designate the problem which we also apply to the 
particular theory offered. Also the same word may be used 
to apply to different problems, or fields of phenomena, 
or to very diverse solutions for them. When you gl'cfc: up 
a book or a magazine article headed by some term like 
"The Subconscious", "The Unconscious", it is impossible 
to judge from the heading what may be contained in the 
(8-r) 
the article. The use of the term "Unconscious*, made 
familiar by Eupopean writeBs, especially including, 
J.W.F.Myers, Van Hartmann. and as used by Bergson, seems 
clear enough, but when a person trained in that usage of 
the word picks up Dr. Princefs article or book on the 
unconscious, he will have to readjust his terminology, 
and use the word in a new sense almost directly opposite 
to the old, changing from the spiritualistic to a possible 
materialistic meaning. Dr. Prince makes the term subcon**o 
scious the inclusive term dividing it into the unconscious 
(neurograms) and the co-conscious. This is a very accept^b 
able scheme or solution for a person who agrees with Dr. 
Prince in his theories. But a person who has a different 
theory than Dr. Prince finds himself with all the terms 
in use already appropriated by an opposing theory. Prof. 
James would have a hard time stating what he means if he 
accepted Dr. Prince's division of terms. 
The term subconscious is even more loosely used. 
One common usage is that as given it by James, or McDoug-
al, as the part of the living mental personality not 
present in consciousness, or that part of the mental 
processes not present in consciousness. But this theory 
is strenuously opposed by those who, for various reasons 
insist on an arbitrary identification of mind and conscious-
(7-r) 
ness, who nevertheless go on to propose another theory, 
but still head their essays as treatises of the subcon-
scious, meaning something altogether different. This 
would be all right if by the subconscious they meant 
only to designate the field or the problem, but they in 
fact make no such distinction, but use the term indis-
criminately for the field of phenomena, and for the dif-
ferent theories offered in solution. So it may mean 
either the unconscious part of mental activity of a 
single self; the detached bits of consciousness lying 
outside the personal consciousness (the panpsychist 
view), or it may be used as meaning the working or exist-
ence of another self, auxiliary to uour self", a view 
that in every individual there is a double personality. 
So to speak of the unconscious or the subconscious, 
§ 
without defining what is meant, is either to convey no 
meaning at all, or else to run the risk of being altogether 
understood. The author may be astonished at the inter-
pretation given to his words. 
The term 'consciousness1 itself, which has a very 
definite meaning for the unsophisticated seems to lose 
its meaning if too closely studied. We know very well what 
is meant when we say that a person is unconscious* But 
some will insist that the limp body may be full of con-
sciousnesses, a difficulty arising from the identification 
(S) 
of the psychical with consciousness. The double aspect 
view solves the problem by adroitly extending the term 
consciousness to cover the whole field and then turns 
around and divides it into personal and unpersonal 
consciousness, meaning only by personal consciousness 
what the common man means by consciousness, and by the 
rest what majr be called anything from mechanics to dis-
sociated personalities. Dr. Prince is consistent in apply-
ing the term co-consciousness rather than subconsciousness 
to this field of psychic activity, as he interprets it, 
but he makes a mistake when he uses the term subconscious 
as a term covering this co-conscious, and the unconscious 
which is limited to the physical. 
This Babel is extremely discouraging to the person 
beginning a study of the subject, unless he chooses to 
begin by allying himself rigidly to one or another of the 
various positions. If he does this he will no doubt be 
satisfied by the terms in use as he uses them, as long as 
he does not care for any terms to use in the discussion 
of other theories. It is not without good reasons that 
outsiders accuse psychologists and philosophers of making 
great problems for themselves by profound juxtaposition 
of words. It is no wonder that philosophy is so often 
(9-r) 
regarded as sickening by the concrete minded, practical 
man of affairs. But nevertheless the problem of philosophy 
and psychology are of extreme interest and of vital impofct-
ance to everybody if they can be once stripped from the 
great smothering fungus network of meaningless abstractions 
so far as the vital life of man in society is concerned. 
The problem of the unconscious or the subconscious is one 
such problem. 
It is almost with disgust that this discussion of the 
use of terms is written, but it seems necessary. We all 
have our use of terms, our biases and prejudices, most of 
which we are not conscious of. Those who agree with Prince 
will use his terms, or with James will use his, etc. Time 
alone, and greatly increased knowledge of the field stud-
ied, will give us a common terminology. So while a division 
of terms will now be given it is not meant or hoped that 
it be accepted by any one else, but only that the use 
made of them in this paper may be clear, with some hints 
of the reasons for making the division I have made. 
To begin with it seems as though the whole termin-
ology which has grown up is unfortunate. In discussing 
theories offered for the solution of other problems we 
do not often find such a confusion, and the reason 
(10-r) 
largely lies in the way which we hyposticise the term 
we use in dealing with "the subconscious". For example, 
in discussing the problem of the mind and body action, 
we would be hooted out of court if we began speaking of 
"the problem of The Interaction ", or of "the parallel", 
or of "the fipiphenomenon", or again if we, .in addition 
to begging the question in the naming of the question, 
we began talking about "the parallel" as filling in the 
gulf between the physical and the psychical, or of "the 
interaction" as some separate entity by which the problem 
may be solved. But there is as much reason for quarreling 
over the reality or objective existence of these relations 
as separate entities as there is of any other. "We are con-
tinually trying to make metaphysical or concrete entities 
out of abstractions. 
We are clear as long as we find words on which we 
can use the magic "istic" or "al". To speak of the 
interactionistic view of the mind-body relation is to 
speak clearly, and also to leave room for the discussion 
of other theories: not so if we start out by calling the 
mind-body question the problem of the "Interaction", and 
then argue as to the existence of the interaction. 
In the first place it is essential that we keep 
clear the distinction between the realm of facts for 
(11-r) 
which we are seeking an explanation and the theories 
offered as explanations. Two divisions have been consid-
ered. The first is merely to speak of the problem of the 
unconscious as the problem of the breaks in the contents 
of conscious processes, and then to designate the theories 
offered as those of the non-conscious interpretation (the 
physical nerve dispositions and activity). Second, of the 
co-conscious theory of Prince, and third, of the subcon-
scious explanation, distinct from the other two. This 
would be much better than that offered by Dr. Prince 
because it does not exclude any of the theories from the 
discussion as Dr. Prince's does, leaving no placefsBor 
the third in our division. One difficulty in this divi-
sion is that we seek some world to designate the phenomena 
under discussion. 
It has seemed advisabl for several easons that if 
we must have one word for the field, that we call the 
problem the field of the unconscious, as that seems the 
best word to use if we are not to beg the question of 
the explanation in the beginning. So we shall use the 
term unconscious to apply to those gaps or breaks in the 
conscious contents. In so doing we may make a broad 
provisional use of the word, so that it will not conflict 
(12-r) 
with any one of the three theories offered, should any of 
them be finally established. All that is meant by the 
term is that the phenomena it stands for are not manifest-
ed in our personal consciousness, Then if we finally 
decide $hat they are nevertheless mental, the term will 
apply. It will also be in order if we accept the physiolog-
ical interpretation. What is meant is only to find in it a 
convenient means of referring to the field in question. 
The 6nly difficulty will be when the panpsychist may well 
urge that we have not been fair to him because he claims 
that the phenomena are not "unconscious" but "un-personal-
conscious", a difficulty brought on by his use of the 
term consciousness. So in using the term unconscious we 
must keep this reservation in mind, or else not use it 
and speak of the question of the discontinuities of 
consciousness, which is really much the better thing to do. 
In this discussion the unconscious will mean just that, 
never any theory offered as an explanation oti description. 
Now as to the rest of the difficulty, which is now more 
than half solved in separating the problem foom the 
solutions. 
These theories as we have seen, are offered. 1. The 
physiological, materialistic, non-psychic, non-mental. 
2. The co-conscious, disconnected bits of consciousness. 
(13-r) 
o. Subconscious, submerged part of the one mental process. 
The only difficulty may arise in the case of the first 
and there only if we try to use the term unconscious, 
which at first looks like the very thing to do. As before 
noted that would be flying in the face of past uses of 
the term. One temptation lies in the tendency to make a 
division in three similar terms like the unconscious, 
co-conscious, and subconscious. The third could 7/ell be 
called the psychical were it not that the difficulty 
would arise of disposing of the second in such a scheme, 
which claims to be psychical, but in which the explanation 
is based so directly on physiology. In other words the 
generaltheory back of it, the double aspect view, would ' 
deny the division of physical and psychical, and claim 
both or neither. 
This only shows some of the difficulties. 
Perhaps the most essential thing is to cease making 
an arbitrary distinction of mind and consciousness, and 
even though firmly convinced that such a statement 
represents the truth, we should be willing to let the 
proof rest rather on empirical investigation than on 
any dogmatis assumption. Some may claim that this will 
mean the ruination of psychology, but it seems that the 
(14-r) 
only thing ruined, if anything, will be the particular 
assumptions upon which some choose to build, which 
assumptions are often made only to be forgotten as soon 
as the serious discussion of the data of science commences. 
If we wish to limit psychology to the analysis of 
conscious facts, that is no reason for claiming that all 
the facts which may unexpectedly confront us must also 
be included under the category of conscious facts. Why 
not gracefully admit the possibility of new factors 
having aris n since the first assumptions were made and 
that now in thw light of these new facts, our definitions 
must be revised? I see few reasons why this cannot be 
done without abandoning the whole field and deserting 
to biological behaviorism. We have been trying to let 
an early definition set the limit now, and in order to • 
find a way to consider factors unheard of when the 
definition was made, we h«ve considered ourselves under 
the strict necessity of bringing all under the head of 
conscious phenomena. Psychology studies consciousness, 
they say. These new facts must be cinsidered, therefore 
they must be considered as being conscious. There is one 
alternative, open to those who wish to identify mind 
and consciousness. 
(IS) 
The other way in which these troublesome mental 
phenomena may be disposed of is to say that they do not 
belong to psychology at all, but father th physiology, 
assuming such a wise division between the two sciences 
that what belongs to physiology can in no way be consid-
ered in psychology. "Facts are deferred to the subconscious 
mind which do not belong to mind at all, but are simply 
processes in the physical organism," says Munsterberg* 
(Psychotherapy, p. 130). This only shows the straits to 
which such an identification of terms will lead one. 
I see no reason why the introspectionist should need 
to claim that what he introspectively observes is the 
whole process# The day may be coming when we can assume a 
psychical instead of a physical substrate for conscious-
ness. Beneath the physical world as we perceive it lies 
some common basis which we in our ignorance call matter. 
Back of the appearances or aspects, lies the true reality 
of this 'matter1 which we never perceive. Now what is to 
hinder us from supposing that the psychical phenomena 
of which we are conscious are also grounded in some reality 
the essence of which, like that of matter, id hid from 
us? Nothing. In fact we are compelled to do so. The 
question is whether we make the substrate beneath the 
physical phenomena serve also as the substrate of con-
(16-r) 
scious phenomena. Are they both appearances of the same 
fundamental reality or have they different bases? 
As it is now those psychologists who various 
reasons identify mind and consciousness look at the 
problem of the subconscious interpretation of the 
difficulty ms some phantasm which, even if only admitted 
to discussion would speedily destroy all that has ever 
been acomplished by psychology. If we accept it, Titch-
ener says, "we voluntarily leave the phere of fact for 
the sphere of fiction" (Psychology, P. 40). This tendency 
is more noticeable among the American psychologists. The 
result is that one will see nothing in mental phenomena 
but consciousness where another sees every where the 
manifestations of a subconscious mental activity. * 
Munsterberg looks over the disputed field -nd says that, 
"erteKt if we welcome facts of the widest limits there can 
be no doubt that the subconscious is never among them". 
(Symposium P.16). Jastrow, Preud, or Prince look over 
the same phenomena and see direct evidence every where 
of the subconscious. There have been many fierce dis-
putes which have been ended when the adversaries have 
found themselves talking in different terms about the 
same thing, and having discovered this, have often found 
themselves in complete accord. Many of the difficulties 
(17-r) 
of getting at the heartof the matter of the interprets^ 
tion to be made of the unconscious, are of this same 
sort, and will largely settle themselves as soon as we 
are familiar enough with the problem to agree ori a com-
mon terminology. Perhaps a better knowledge will suggest 
an entirely new terminology free from all ambiguity, or 
achieve the .same end by fcimodification of the ones we 
now have. 
i 
Much of the confusion has been indirectly due to the 
fact that psychology with its faulty terminology concerning 
the fiifferent levels and aspects of consciousness and 
behavior has left this field, of discovery to those who 
were not versed in even this faulty terminology, but whose 
work has proven so valuable and pertinent to psychology 
that psychologists have been compelled to take note of 
it. It is significant as Dr. Schofield says, that while 
the general run of physicians may not, yet the masters 
of the science have almost invariably given the mind a 
large place in the practice of medicine. They claim to 
find the 7/ofcking of a psychic principle, below the level 
of consciousness, which cannot be accounted for in physic, 
ological or chemical terms. They have found that the only 
way to treat many diseases, especially of the mind, or 
some of the so-called nervous disorders, is through the 
(18-r) 
the mind itself, and not through drugs. And still we 
want to base everything on physiology in order to be 
scientific. And what should such a physician think if 
he were told by Titchener, that while he is talking in 
terms of common-sense interactionism, he must be gare-
ful to think in ter.ns of parallelism. 
It is not enough to accuse a physician of not 
knowing what he is talking about when he talks of 
"unconscious mental processes", for it is possible 
that he is talking about something with tahich psychology 
ourht to be fand>liar if it is to serve humanity, btifc 
is in trouble only when he tries to state the results 
of his researches in psychological terms. Let us be 
glad that they are at work accomplishing results while 
we are busy trying to catalog them. 
We have seen that many factors have entered into 
the present difficulty over terms. There has been a 
confusion of the problem with the theories offered, 
the same term being used for each case, but a differ-
ent term selected for that double use by different 
people: that it is also due to making the same word 
serve in such different, or even oposing meanings: that 
the historical development-along different lines have 
(19-r) 
been partly accountable for this: that much valuable 
work has been written without making a careful choice 
of words; and that probably the most general cause has 
been the tendency to regard all such terms as conscious-
ness, mind, psychical as having identical meanings. Sev-
eral reasons lie back of this tendency which will be 
studied later. 
Now it may seem that the time given to this question 
of terms has been entirely out of proportion to its im-
portance, but I must confess that the greatest obstacle 
I had to overcome in my study of the subject so far , 
has been thi s very ques tion of trying; to find out what 
an author has meant by his particular usage of the terms. 
It is disconcerting to find Munsterberg dispos-ing of the 
subconscious by saying that there is none, and then giving 
almost the same explanation to some of the phenomena 
under discussion, partcul&rljr the abnormal, as Prince 
makes, who believes firmly that which he often names the 
subconscious, tinder which he includes both types of 
explanation offered by Munsterberg. Nearly all of what 
Munsterberg applies to a subconscious personality, or 
subconscious self, so that obviously, what he says has 
little application to the notion also called that of 
the subconscious by those who use it as does James or 
(20-r) 
McDoug&l. But it is hard to remember this when Munster-
berg is making his sweeping statements about the non-
exixtence of t e subconscious, which are denied exist-
ence largely because they fail to agree with his 
assumptions, and not for any lack of evidence. It is a 
case of making the facts fit the theory instead of making 
the theory fit the facts. Of course he would say that 
psychological theory has nothing to do with the facts 
anyway. 
III. How ever this may be, we must not suppose that 
there, are no deeper problems at the bottom of the dis-
pute over the subconscious. W^ile the confused use of 
terms has caused many misunderstandings, and much waste 
of effort in misplaced attacks, atlll the chief factor 
in producing the different theories, and in their 
acceptance has been the different attitude from which 
the problem has been approached. It is inevitable that 
we should interpret new facts in the light of out more 
firmly fixed viewpoint. These assumptionsrpresuppos-
itions are of two general classes, the metaphysical, 
generally submerged and held in the back ground of our 
thinking, and the methodological, or our assumptions as 
to the proper limits of science, and as to the methods 
(21-r) 
to. be used. While it is not the business of psychology 
to discuss these metaphysical positions, still they 
should be more readily recognized in the results they 
produce in our thinking. This is especially important 
in reading the writings of a writer who starts from 
such a position as that held by Munsterberg. Perhaps 
the happy day is coming when our psychology will not 
be so dependent on our metaphysics, and when we will no 
longer be required to ask whether a statement is made 
as a psychologist or as a man, whether it applies to 
real life or only to science. 
It is hardly nedessary to dwell at leanfth on the 
question of these different positions or how they affect 
the different treatments of the unconscious- The mater-
% 
ialists, the dualists(and the adherents of the Double-
aspect view), and the spiritualists, will treat the 
question in the light of their general positions. The 
materialist will arrive at the first, the dualistat the 
second, and the spiritualist at the third, of the 
different explanations of the unconscious. 
IV When we come to the question of the standpoint and 
methods we come to a more openly avowed problem, le 
find those who would reduce psychology to p?!y6kolt>gy, 
(22-r) 
or to biology, and others who would use physiology merely 
as a starting point from which to depart to the analysis 
of conscious experiences, but still maintaining that 
their work can be properly called scientific enly so 
long as this strained position is maintained. 
Others trlaim that psychology should be more a 
study of the real life, of the ideals and values affecting 
the conduct of the individualThey want to study the 
psychic life of man as it is, without any transformations. 
Psychology without a soul, or without consciousness, is 
like a play of I anilet with Hamlet left out.(Calkins). 
Of this division the first will generally support the 
fiBSt two theories of the unconscious, the latter the 
third. 
c. Division of theories as to standpoint and Method 
le have found the three theories offered as solutions 
of the unconscious, and.'two general standpoints, the 
physiological and the mental. The lastl two theories 
admit the p esence af a psychic factor, which the first 
denieso But while the second admits the presence of a 
psychic factor, it believes this psychic phenomena to 
be a consciousness detached from the main stream, 
accompanied with a separation of physical functioning, 
by which it is generally•explained f. It does nothing 
to establish the continuity of the mental series, 
conscious or unconscious. It implicitly denies such a 
continuity, which it finds only in the physiological 
processes, nerve dispositions, or 'neurograms•. The first 
two are generally parallelists by profession, although 
the parallelism is nearly always one sided, a means of 
avoiding any interacion between body and mind in one 
direction only. An avov/ed parallelist will talk contin-
ually of the affect of nerve excitation upon conscious-
ness. The double-aspect advocate gives the sains sort of 
explanation as the one just noted and also falls into 
the error of explaining one of the aspects by the other. 
They find one aspect where the other is lacking. The 
inseparable are separated.(see Prince,nUnconscious"p.237). 
The first two then are opposed to the third, offering a 
(24-r) 
physical as opposed to a psychical explanation. This 
because only the third regards the psychical as having 
any effect on the behavior in question. 
Owing to bis way of looking at tilings, the man 
who approaches the problem from. tve side of physiology 
and who, thpugh admitting the mental factor in the 
process, endeavors to explain mental phenomena as 
dependent on physiology, which is in turn basdd on 
physics, willl have one set of -difficulties in dealing 
with the hypothesis of the subconscious. He must 
account for the different dispositions of the neurones 
how and why they come to be arranged as they are, and 
why they ar.e sometimes accompanied by self-consciousness 
and sometimes not. Where others speak of the subcon-
scious he chooses to speak of the non-psychic and non-
conscious activity, or of co-conscious, dissociated or 
alternating personalities, to be explained by reference 
to dissociated functioning of nerve centers, or he may 
seek to avoid the question entirely by denying the con-
tinuity of the conscious processes, it being obvious 
that there can be no dividing of what was never united. 
Those of the second division, including the 
iuiimist or vitalist, escape from any of the difficulties 
(27-r) 
of the first by saying that consciousness is only % 
part of the psychic process, or of the organizing 
principle, the rest of course being that to which we 
apply the term subconscious, but another sot of special 
difficulties will confront them. They will be confront-
ed by those who fail to see the benefit to be derived 
from such a hypothesis and will be accused of still 
having a dualism between the body and mind, as well as 
a dualism within the mind. He will hold to the contin-
uity of the mental processes, and when I say mental 
here I say it as he uses it, as including consciousness 
as an element. Of course they do not deny the influence 
of the body on the mental processes but they make the 
mind supreme and think more of the brain as the organ 
of the mind. They are generally interactionists, but 
not necessarily so. 
It is obvious that the telepathist, spiritualist, 
Christian scientist, etc., will belong to this division 
nor should we be too hasty in pasing judgement on these 
things. Science has been so strong in its condemnation 
of the people trying to establish these things that it 
has never made an exhaustive study of the matter itself, 
by substituting its own methods for the slip-shod ones 
(26) 
now so often used. 
Now by no means do I want to be understood as 
implying thatevery body is at heart either a believer 
in the pure mechanistic theory of life, or else in 
animism. What I do want to say Is that which men of 
almost every metaphysical^episfiomological creed are to 
be found discussing this field of phenomena, as soon 
as they get into the practical discussion of the sub-
ject they will be found inclining toward one or the 
other of the two positions. 
For a clear understanding of the three positions, 
1., in a non-mental, 2., in a co-conscious and 3, in $ 
subconscious position, I have endeavored to bring 
together some of the opposing attitudes on different 
questions, The first two are on one sidm of the line 
opposing the third. While accasionally there may be an 
exception on some?/partcular point, yet most if not all 
the treatments so far mage may be placed in one or the 
other group. By no means will a person falling in 
either class occujjby all the positions on that side of 
the line. But with any of the oppositions, the choice 
of one or the other side will determine whether the per-
(29-r) 
son will end with a co-conscious or a subconscious 
theory, the non-mental belonging with the first. 
1.Mind equals conscious'rtess. 1.Mind,or the psychical,are 
Psychical,mental, and con- broader terms, including 
scious are synonomous terms* consciousness. 
2.Mental states are 'explain- 2.Nerve dispositions are 
ed1 as dependent on nerve dependent on the mental 
dispositions. states, as well as vice-
versa. 
3.Epiphenomenalism,Parallel*-" 3. Interactionism. 
ism,or the Double aspect 
view. 
4.Hind is a phenomenon or 
' accompaniment of brain 
activity,apart from which 
it has no existence. 
5.Telepathy impossible. 
(Though I fail to see how 
it follows, even from 
their premises.) 
6.Phenomena under discussiom 
are non-mental, or co-con-
scious. 
4.Mind has a separate exist-
ence apart from the body, 
or Is capable of such 
existence. 
5. Telepathy possible, $>r 
probable. Some say it has-
been proven. 
6. Most of the phenomena 
should be called the 
subconscious. 
7.Unconscious cerebration is 
due to purely physiological 
activities, with either no 
psychic element at all, or 
else accompanied by a 
consciousness apart from the 
main stream, with which it 
it co-conscious. 
7.So-called unconscious 
cerebration is due to the 
operation of some vital 
or organizing principle. 
8. Co-consciuusness is pre-
sent only in abnormal or p 
ological cases. 
8.Subconscious operations 
"are a factor in nearly if 
not mental activity. 
(28-r) 
The parallelists come under one or the other of the 
divisions, as they choose one or the o her of the follow-
ing opposing positions. 
a revised terminoogy and a more careful use of it 
would he!jbp much to clear away the difficulties in this 
last division. 
Having now seen the difficulties besetting a study 
or discussion on a common ground, of the unconscious,as 
well as the difficulties in the way of reaching a common 
conclosion, and having also classified the different 
theories according to certain principles, it remains to 
take up these three different theories for a further 
and more complete discussion. 
9•Normal unity of the 9.Normal unity of the mind 
but mind includes consc -
iousness. 
mind,where mind is equi-
valent to consciousness. 
(This leads to some very 
peculiar positions.) 
10.There is no continuity 
of mind. 
10.There may be no continuity 
in consciousness, but there 
is in the whole mental 
process,or in psychic sct-
ivity. 
(29-r) 
D. Discussion of the Three Theories. 
I. Non-mental theory. 
Strangely enough while the exponents of the non-
mental or purely psychical, explanation of t he uncon-
scious phenomena claim the physiological processes ex-
plain all, we are told but little as to the particulars 
of the explanation. Their work is mainly negative, being 
concerned more with finding the difficulties of the 
other explanations than with giving an exposition of t 
their own (as we all are, more or less). If a critical 
study of one or two apparently alternative positions 
shows that great difficulties are involved in such a 
position, the other one is often-more uncritically accept-
ed as true. This afcfcfcunts for the attitude of man of 
those who hold to the non-me&fc&H £ypec>6f ttheory. 
Again, some assume that this is really the only 
explanation which can ever be scientific, that it is 
the only one which admits af safe and sane methods. They 
claim that it is demanded by science, but the quicker 
science learns that it must not conflict with fact, the 
better for it. Truth can ofaly harm a science based on 
false premises. If a subconscious or a co-conscious 
interpretation can cause the down-fall of the whole 
.fabric of science, true or not, then it is a worse than 
(30-r) 
useless fabric and the quicker it falls the better. I 
do not mean to say that the subconscious position is by 
any means proven, but that it is dangerous to rule any 
thing out or to condemn it as untrue on an a priori 
basis. Titchener, for example, seems to believe that 
the psychologist has no business with the subconscious, 
or any unconscious processes, except insofar as they 
may be explained by physiology. The following from his 
text-book admirably sums up his whole position: 
"It is worth while, for the sake of clearness, to 
dwell on this point in more detail. The physical world, 
the world of independent experience, just because it is 
independent of the individual man, is complete and self-
contained. All of the processes thfet make it up are 
bound together as cause and effect; nowhere is there a 
gap or break in their connection. Now among the processes 
that make up this independent world are the processes 
of the nervous system. These are linked as cause and 
effect, both to one another and also to physical, pro-
cesses, outside the body, which precede • nd follow them 
thfey have their fixed place in the unbroken chain of 
physical events; they may themselves be explained, ex-
actly as the occurrence of dew is explained. Mental 
processes on the other hand correspond, not to the whole 
(31-r) 
series of physical events, but to only a small part of 
them, namely, to certain events within the nervous sys-
tem, It is natural then, that mental phenomena should 
appear scrappy, disconnected, unsystematic. It is also 
natural that we should seek their explanation in the 
nervous processes that run parallel to them, and whose 
causal conn ction with all the pther processes of the 
independent world insures the continuity that they so 
conspicuously lack. Mind lapses every night and reforms 
every morning; but the bodily processes go on, in sleep 
and in waking. An idea drops out of..memory, to recur, 
quite unexpectedly, many years later; but the bodily 
processes have been going on without interuption. Refer-
ence to the body does not add onei.Iota to the data of 
psychology, to the sum of ihtrospections. It does not 
furnish us with explanatory principle for psychology; 
it do^s not ebable uS to systematise our introspective 
data* Indeed, if we refuse to explain mind by b#dy, we 
must^acceptocuie or the other of two .equally unsatisfact-
ory alternatives: We must either i?est content with the 
simple description of mental experience, or must invent 
an unconscious mind to give continuity and coherence to 
the conscious. Both courses have been tried. But, if we 
take the first, we necer arrive at a science of psychoid 
(32-r) 
ogy; and if we take the second, we voluntarily leave the 
sphere of fact for the sphere of fiction". (Titchener 
Text-Book of Psychology: Pages 39-40). 
It is well to note the assumptions of this passage, 
upon which the whole attitude is based. He assumes that 
the physical world is complete, self-contained, indep-
endent. Secondly, that the causal series is complete, 
there being no gap p. or breaks in the connections of the 
causal series, and that there is no causal connection 
in the psychical series. Thirdly, he assumes that we 
know more of the physical series of cause and effect 
than we do of the mental processes. Neither assumption 
is by any means proven as true. Titchener may reject 
the subconscious as belonging to the sphere of fiction 
because it is not subject to his introspection. But can 
he be justified in claiming that the whole mental pro-
cess is subject to introspection? Does he ever introspect 
the real process? One thing is sure, when he gives any 
explanation of the unconscious he leaves the sphere of 
introspectionable phenomena. Why then is the physical 
explanation so much nearer his heart than the psychical? 
Because of the three unproven assumptions just noted? He 
may, as some do, say that d>t was assumed to begin with 
that the consciousness and mind aue identical.. He says: 
(33-r) 
"In its second sense, consciousness is identified 
with mind, and 'eonscious1 with •mental1. So long as 
mental processes are going on, consciousness is present; 
as soon as mental processes are in abeyance, unconscious-
ness sets in.u (Text-Book Psychology Page 18). 
"It is not only unnecessary but It is also misleading, 
to speak of consciousness as the mind's awareness of 
ijrself. The usage is unnecessary, because as we shall 
see later, this awareness is a matter of observation 
of the same general kind as observation of the external 
world; it i3 misleading, because it suggests that mind 
is a personal being, instead of a stream of processes. 
He shall therefore take mind and consciousness to mean 
the same thing. But as we have the two different words, 
and it is convenient to make some distinction between 
them, we shall speak of mind when we mean the sum total 
of processes occurring in the life-time of an individual, 
and we shall speak of consciousness w1en we mean the sum 
total of processes occurring no?/, at any given1 present1 
time,. Consciousness will thus be a section, a division, 
of the mind-stream." "(Text-Book Psychology: Pages 18-19). 
But this assumption is first and foremost a begging of 
the question, is only another way of stating the same 
thing. It furnishes no excuse for denying mentality to 
(34-r) 
the unintrospectionable. Science must get at the truth, 
even though that may not be its chief end. It must be 
in harmony with truth and has* no more grounds for assum-
ing an unbroken physical series than an unbroken psych* 
ical series. If it is admissable to introduce physical 
links in the psychical series, there is no good reason 
for refusing to admit psychical series. A working hyp-
othesis, recognized as such in profession and practice, 
is extremely valuable. But it is a different matter 
when we refuse to revise it as we go along. They are 
made as a preliminary guide, not as something to be 
maintained at all hazards. If the conclusions of the 
physicist and those of the psychologist are contradictary 
there must be a readjustment somewhere along the line. 
Much of what has been said will apply to the pos-
ition of that arch-enemy of the subconscious, Prof. Mun-
sterberg. He makfes the strongest attack on what he calls 
the 'subconscious mind1, in the chapter on the subject 
in his "Psychotherapy". But it should be noted that most 
of what he says there applies to the conception of the 
f subliminal self1, or of the double personality. It is 
directed against the conception of a separated, coherent, 
organized conscious self, which divides the work with 
the conscious self. It has but little to- do with the * 
. (35) 
conception of the subconscious as used in this paper 
as the subli .inal operations of a psychical process, a 
use similar to that made of the term by McDougal, or by 
James in his "Varieties of Religious Experience". While 
he is materialistic in his psychology, and hance offers 
a non-inental, or physiological explanation of the un-
conscious, still he has not much of,a quarrel with the 
co-conscious explanation, which however he applies inly 
in abnormal cases, and here only for the sake of conven-
ience. To get a proper conception of his real position 
his article in the Symposium appearing in the 'Journal 
of Psychology1 should be read before fche chapter in the 
'Psychotherapy1. As he is perhaps £he chief represent-
ative of this non-mental explanation, I have chosen to 
give something of his position as representative of the 
group. It is interesting to note that while Munst.erberg 
reaches his conclusions as the direct outcome of his 
peculiar metaphysical position and of the resulting 
attitude toward science in general, that yet these con-
clusions are considered^.as final by many who would very 
vigorously reject the premises upon which his argument 
is reached. It is lamentatole that we must divide the 
statements of a man into two divisions, that in which 
he is speaking as a man, and that in which he is speak-
(36-r) 
ing as a scientist, and that a statement in one case 
may be contradictary on the surface to a statement in 
the other. 
Concerning the question at hand$ he says: !lWe 
therefore find three types of theories, the first back-
ed mostly be laymen, the second by physicians, the third 
by psychologists. Yet the lines are not to be flrawn 
sharply. Tlie first group says: the subconscious is a 
psychical system of a full real personality below the 
conscious person; that subconscious remembers, thinks, 
feels,wills, on its own accord, influences our conscious 
life, helps it out, shines through it, and causes the 
abnormal facts. The popular mind clings to such a 
convenient method of explanation the more closely as it 
is on this basis easy to bring the subconscious selves 
into telepathic connection or to link them with mystical 
agencies. The second group says:the subconscious is 
psychical but not a system, it is made up of ideas, but 
they do not at first form a personality; it is dissociat-
ed, split off#mental material which only i&aa secondary 
way flow together into a new detached self, The 
subconscious is then not at all a regular psychical 
foundation but is something either pathological or at 
(37-r) 
leafet artificial. The third group, finally, says: 
the subconscious that underlies the abnormal facts 
is the same that underlies the ordinary processes of 
memory, attention, etc.; it is not psychical at all, 
but a physiological brain process. 
"The emotional demands of the mystic, the practical 
demands of the physician, and the theoretical demands 
of the psychologist are well fulfilled by these three 
types of theories, and to a certain extent they can be 
helpful, side by side; the prupose which we have before 
us determines each time which of the three modes of 
construction Is most useful for our special end." 
(Symposium Pages 19-20). 
lie really feels "inclined to take the place with 
the psychologists in the third group; the subconscious 
at allli.(20). As none of these theories tell us any 
thing of real life he believes the only correct way of 
deciding Is this; "which of the many constructions of 
the not-conscious eauses is the most useful for the 
explanation of the observed facts?" (17). But why is 
this materialistic method the most useful? 
He believes that in every one of these cases where 
the subconscious is called in that the relations can be 
much better expressed in physical or In neurological 
terms. "Psychology considers the inner experience there 
(38-r) 
fore, for its special purpose as a series of describable 
phenomena; it transforms the felt realities of will into 
perceivable objects, into contents of consciousness" (26). 
Any scientific treatment must be in terms of causal con-
nettion2 But "this material which, through the objecti-
fication, has lost all its inner teleological ties, has n 
not even a chance to enter into any direct causal con-
nections. The physical phenomena can and must be con-
ceited as causally connected, the psychical not. There 
cannot be causality where the objects do not last but 
are destroyed in the very act of their appearance: just 
this is characteristic of all psychologies; contents. 
The world is physical insofar as we conceive it as iu 
identical with itself in ever new experiences, and to 
elaborate this self-identity of the material universe 
is the meaning of the causal treatment. The object ifi 
psychical just in so far as it is not identical in new 
experiences, but is created anew in every act. Therefore 
there is no direct causal connection of the psychologised 
inner life;therefore there isoonly an indirect causal 
explanation of psychical phenomena possible in so far 
as they can be conceived as accompaniments of the 
physiological processes. In short, even the full conscious 
mental facts do not really hang together when viewed from 
(39-r) 
a psychological point of view and are thus unfit to 
explain any results through their causal interplayj 
they are epiphenomena, and the causal working of the 
objectified conscious facts goes on in the physiological 
sub-stratum.u (Symposium, Pages 27-28). 
Therefore there is no motive for conceiving a 
psychical fact outside of consciousness. "The dissociated 
idea is psychologically not existent just as the tick-
ing of the clock in my room does not exist for me when 
my attention is turned to my reading; the ticking reach-
es my brain and may t ere have after-effects, bixt the 
sound sensation is inhibited. In this way all that which 
suggested the theory of the mental subconscious becomes 
simply increased or decreased Inhibition. Why the mental 
accompaniments of certain physiological processes are 
some times inhibited must of course itself be explained 
physiologically; every thing seems to point to the re-
lation between sensory excitement arun the openness or 
closedneds of the motor channels of discharge.* (Sympos-
ium Page 30). 
Affcfer all this it JLsrhafrd todundferstand any such 
distinction as he makes at the close. "The physiological 
(40-r) 
psychologist thus ought carefully to avoid the language 
of the subliminal self theory as it flows over too easily 
into anti-philosophy. But he has no reason to avoid the 
language of the dissociated idea theory— provided that 
the psychological word is taken as short label for the 
very complex neural physiological process. If I had to 
write the history of Miss Beauchamp I should conceive all 
subconscious processes in physiological conceptions, but 
I should describe them, for clearness and convenience 
sake, as the master of our symposium has so masterly 
done, in the terms of psychological language. " (Sym-
posium, Pages 31-32). 
In the beginning of the chapter in the * Psychother-
apy-, he is much more radical in his attacks on the 
subconscious as possible explanations of such phenomena 
as post hypnojric suggestion, or automatic writing, which 
explanations he characterizes as "fantasies of psycholog-
ical fiction" (129). Strangely fehough for mne who banks 
so largely on1logical necessity1 he wants "to turn to 
the concrete facts" (130). Also, "let us see them in the 
spirit of modern scientific psychology, let us try to 
explain them in harmony with the principles of psychol-
ogical explanat ion* (130). 
But he still rules out the subconscious explanation 
(41-r) 
on logical grounds. For M m there is no problem in psy-
chology of the continuity of consciousness, or of the 
psychical processes, mere epiphenomena. "Consciousness 
he says, "is in no way active. Consciousness cannot 
change anything in the content nor can it connect the 
contents" (134). "Every change and every fusion and 
every process must be explained through the relations 
of the various contents to one another " (134)."To have 
psychical existence at all is to be the object of aware-
ness for a consciousness" (134), therefore psychical 
objects below consciousness are Impossibilities. Facts 
are either not mental, but physiological, or mental and 
not subconscious (130). Consciousness -as such does not 
have unity, therefore cannot have a double existence; 
cannot be aware of itself; cannot have degrees (135). 
"Its whole meaning lies in being a passive spectator" (13%). 
After this ||lea for the elimination of the psychical 
factor from the explantion the following appears to be 
an almost complete retreat. The rigid methodological 
rules based upon rigid logical necessity have to be bro-
ken someplace along the line. "The so-called subconscious 
which in realityiis fully in consciousness, b&t only 
unnoticed, easily shades over into that unconsciousness 
which is also in consciousness but dissociated from the 
(42-r) 
idea of the own personality and thus somewhat split from 
the interconnected mass of conscious contents" (153). He 
says that objects fully conscious, but not in attention 
are abnormal, but not subconscious (152). Disjointed 
personalities should be called 'co-conscious1, not 
•subconscious1 (155). This shows that in many cases he 
takes the position held by the second theory, the 
co-conscious, or the theory of split off ideas, and that 
the physiological explanation hailed as all-sufficient 
must be dropped eventually by even its most stalwart 
defender. It might be well to ask what relation this split 
off consciousness bears to the content of the focus, in 
how far it effects oufc thinking. Miinsterberg finally 
comes very near the subconscious, and one is almost 
tempted to say that under another name it would appear 
much more seductive to him. But we must remember that 
in his division of t e theories, given, he leaves out 
altogether the conception designated by the term subcon-
scious in this paper. 
It is no purpose of mine to discuss the metaphysical 
position of MUnsterberg any more than has already been 
done. But there are several things concerning the gener-
al attitude of such treatments which should be consid- . 
ered somewhat further than has already been done. 
(3-r) 
First it should be notfedethat the subconscious he 
attacks is that of a separate subliminal self, anfl there 
fore does not directly concern the real subconscious 
theory, as the terms are here used, except in regard to 
the general*: jjjhysiological position. To speak of the 
underground part of a tree is not to postulate the 
existence of a subaerial tree. It is only a continuous 
part, which happene fiot to extend above the surface. 
His most valid reason for rejection Is given in his 
physical stand-point which, however, he rejects In some 
cases and admits co-consciousness in abnormal cases. 
« 
From his physical stand-point, we might ask what is the 
use of such a concession? 
Second: The matter of the stand-point of science 
is an important one for those who believe in the efficacy 
of the non-mental theories only. It is a question as to 
whether 'logical necessity1, from arbitrary presuppositions, 
or 'empirical facts1 are to be the basis of science. If 
a fact disagrees wit our pre-supposition, which is to 
be retained? By all means, the latter, Munsterberg 
would say, because it has no validity as an interpreta-
tion of real life anyway. 
Third: He also makes the unwarranted assumption 
noted in the case of Titchener, that we can know more of 
(44-r) 
the physical processes than we can of the mental. He 
finds that explanations can go only so far, but for-
gets that the same thing is true of physical explan-
ations. We ha e as valid reasons for assuming & psychic 
ether, as the physicists have of assuming theirs. He 
forgets that there are as great or greater difficulties, 
even from his point of view, besetting .the physiological 
explanation as the psychological. There are as many era-
pificnl grounds for belief in the continuity of the 
psychic element as of the physical, or if science is as 
artificial construction it would be as easj to form a 
coherent system of psychic objects as of the physical. 
A concrete example of an instance where ppiritual 
or vitalistic theories both comply more nearly with 
empirical facts, and in which the completely psychical 
explanation is the most useful, and least self-contra-
dictary, is to be found in the question of sleep and 
dreams, a question happily avoided especially by the 
introspectionists, sensationalists. Psychophysiologists 
have offered a number of explanations each of which 
is either self-contradictary or contradictary to observ-
ed or experienced fact. 
(45-r) 
Sleep is a state of general inactivity of a living 
organism. There are any number of things which have been 
advanced as the cause of sleep. In the search to find a 
common medium,through which all these various factors work 
in causing the cessation of consciousness, the vaso-motor 
center was siezed upon, as the organ directing the flow 
of blood toward or away from the brain. But this,the best 
theory offered is open to several criticisms^ There is 
normally always enough blood in the brain for action. 
Pillsbury has shown that the increase of blood flow follows 
some few seconds after the beginning of the activity it 
was supposed to create.("Attention™) So we are justified is 
saying that the decrease in the flow of blood to the cerebrum 
is the effect and not the cause. Sleep Is a positive vital 
process,in which one of the first steps is the inhibition 
of the incoming stimuli,which is emphasized by Dr.Sidis. 
But animals with both cerebral hemispheres removed still 
have their periods of activity and of repose(Richet,Loeb, 
Sidis).And yet all sleep theories are based upon the effects 
of various factors upon the cerebrum. Sleep is in some way 
a matter of the whole organism, and not of a single one of 
its parts. Loss of consciousness is only one phenomena of the 
sleep process. Hence consciousness must be only a part of the 
organic or vital processes going on in the animal. 
(46-r) 
Summary. 
1.Introspectionist,or sensationalist is unconsciously 
lead to assume that the whole mental process is open to 
introspection. 
2. There are no more reasons for believing in a 
physical, ether than in a psychical ether. The same diffi-
culties account either one,and one would be as scientific 
as the other. If a science is artificial it should, not 
matter. If not it is after the truth. 
3.Causal connection is as comprehensible between 
psychical states as between physical motions. 
4.An hypothesis is made as a guide to be corrected 
as the facts demand, not something to be maintained at all 
hazards. 
5. Munsterberg is one of the most influential foes of 
the subconscious. No one should accept his conclusions 
without examining his premises. 
(49-r) 
II. The Co-conscious Theory. 
The second, the co-conscious interpretation of the 
unconscious, occupies a median position between the 
other two, which is the reason Munsterberg accepts it 
in the place of the third wheh he leaves the first. 
Dr. Prince is the most able advocate of this 
position in dealing with the unconscious, and is muEh 
clearer and more definite in his exposition. He recog-
nizes the difficulties of any treatment. He is not so 
prone as manyyto make statements at random, without 
any thought as totthe assumptions and implications 
involved. His treatment will be given as an example. 
Dr. Prince approaches the subject from the view 
of the panpsychist, but generally belongs to the first 
division in the classifieation made on pages 26 to 28 
of this thesis. All mental phenomena are conscious 
phenomena. But there is a division of this. 1. That 
which is synthesized in the main original personality, 
and 2., that which is not, being accompaniment of the 
activity of a dissociated complex. A complex, which 
when active may be included in either of the two divisions, 
is, when inactive, called unconscious. It includes memory, 
etc., which is not functioning but lying dormant. It is 
(48-r) 
purely physical when dormant. In the Symposium he seems 
to say that every action of a nerve complex sets up 
consciousness, which may or may not appear as a part of 
the personal consciousness (96). A system of these dissoc-
iated nerve complexes results in a co-personality, not 
a sub-personality. Without physiological action there 
can be no consciousness, and every physiological action 
does produce a consciousness. He says we have as much 
grounds for attributing consciousness^to a disposition 
of nerve cells in automatic writing as we have of infer-
ring it in another person. He believes this Is proven 
because under hypnosis, the processes some erroneously 
call unconsciousness, can be recalled to memory, are as 
the consciousness couldntiot remember a brain state, there 
must have been con s ciousnoS3 present at he time (Sympos-
ium, Page 90). 
Dr. Prince himself says in the Symposium: ,!And in 
so far as a brain process cah occur detached from the 
main system of brain processes, so far can consciousness 
occur without self-cQnsc lousness. Nor is self-
consciousness a necessiBy element of consciousness. 
**tt*Indeed, even where there is absence of awareness on 
the part of the personal consciousness, the dissociated 
(49-r) 
co-conscious may, per contra, be aware of the content 
of the former* For this reason, if for no other, co-
consciousness is the preferable term. ******** Those 
who imagine the physiological interpretation seem to me 
to involve themselves in difficulties far greater than 
any offeref by the psychological interpretation. It is 
a fundamental interpretation of psychd>-physiology that 
all thought is correlated with physiological activities". 
(98). a******11Yet with a certain modification of our 
conception of the meaning ofi the physical, it is possible 
to reconcile both interpretations. As a pan-psychist I 
find no difficulty: in accepting both a physiological 
and a psychical interpretation. For those who accept 
pan-psychism there is no distinction to be made between 
conscious processes and brain processes of a certain 
order, excepting as a point of view. They become ident-
ified one with the other. The psychical is the reality 
of the physical. I cannot conceive of brain processes 
except as objective phenomena of conscious processes, 
and I cannot conceive of consciousness excepting as the 
reality or "inner life" of brain changes. So that we 
may indifferently describe automatic actions as mani-
festations of physiological activities, if we keep to 
one set of terms, or of psychical activities if we mix 
(50-r) 
the terms . u (Symposium, Pages 94, 95, 96, 98, 99). 
Dr. Prince sometimes uses one set of terms and 
sometimes another, but occupies more generally the 
physiological side of the situation. "It may be that a 
final explanation of many conscious processes, if we 
would avoid the entanglements of metaphysics, must be 
in physiological terms, because it must deal with that 
which belaongs to experience. -x̂ BBBH*llow©ver this may 
be, T no% only say with Professor Munsterberg that 
'the physiological cerebration is well able to produce 
the intellectual result1, but ifcfe MUST be able to do so." 
(100). Here his philosophic or methodological stand 
point causes him to contradict what he had just stated 
on page 98 of the same article. 
In a series of articles in the Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, on the "Unconscious*, he says, "A dissociated 
dormant complex that cannot by any means be aivakened as 
a conscious memory may be aroused into activity as an 
independent co-conscious memory" (334), evidenced in 
automatic writing and crystal gazing. "Aside from 
certain artificial and pathological conditions there Is 
no normal subconscious self, or secondary self, or hid-
den self, properly speaking". 
Prince, as most of us do, shifts from one side of 
(51-r) 
the question to the other. When speaking of physiology, 
it is the main thing, and when talking of mind, it be-
comes the main thing, and there is a large range of 
material which we will include in the one we happen to 
have at the time under consideration. It is easy to 
say at the outset that two phenomena are but two aspects 
of the same process, there being no causal connection, 
and that we will merely explain the one process by its 
correlate, with which we are supposed to be more famil-
iar. But it is hard to talk long about them without 
speaking of one effecting the other. In discussing the 
co-conscious, consciousness appears as being dependent 
on nerve complexes. It is easy to change from saying 
that ideas are dependent on neural complexes, to say-
ing that a suggested ideaearouses these complexes into 
activity, producing the nerve-currents. He here says 
that the vaso-motor and secretary follow the aoousal 
of emotions, and says that the galvanometer proves it. 
This offere physical proof of the influences of the 
mental states, whether conscious or co-conscious, on 
the physical processes of the body (396-397). Again he 
says that a complex stimulated by a word idea produces 
a feeling tone, which in turn effects the body. After 
distinguishing between physiological and psychological 
(52-r) 
processes, he draws another distinction between psychi-
cal and psychological. "A distinction should be made 
between psychical and psychological, these not being 
co-extensive and always interchangeable terms. Psycho-
logical pertains to the empirical data of consciousness 
(thoughts, ideas, .sensations, etc.), while psychical 
pertains to the inner or ultimate nature of these data. 
Though the data as given in consciousness are psychical, 
that which is psychical may not be solely manifested 
as psychological phenomena^y.It may be manifested as 
physical phenomena, and perhaps be identified with the * 
energy of the universe. Hence the doctrine of panpsychism. 
And so it may be that in its ultimate analysis an uncon-
scious process is psychical (monism) although n6t mani-
festing itself as a datum of consciousness." The 
distinction is valid enough perhaps, but what becomes of 
the practical distinction between physiology and psychol-
ogy. We are all of us prone to mix our ultimate meta-
physics with our practical science. 
Much light is thrown upon the coeconscious theory 
by recognizing that it is particularly adaptable to the 
'double aspectf view, or in other words, to panpsychism. 
This position in general agrees with the first in stating 
that mind and consciousness have identical meaning. To 
(53-r) 
be mental is to be conscious. They also agree generally 
that the double aspect operations are to be most scien-
tifically treated in terms of the physical aspect. They 
would agree with Munsterberg that split off ideas are 
to be explained by split off nerve complexes. Why they 
cannot as readily say that the other or obverse relation 
Is not as valid, is not easy to see fro i their premises. 
Practically what they do in an effort to cling to con-
sciousness but to reject interactionism, is to go over 
to epiphcnomenalism or materialism. The double aspect 
position is often orily a convenient starting place, to 
be ignored latter. 
They agree with fchaethird in the belief of a psych-
ic factor in the unconscious. The difference is that 
it is not strictly an 'unconscious1 part of the mind's 
operations, but split off ideas, separated consciousness, 
fully consciouH not incorporated In the personal con-
sciousness. TThile Munsterberg finally admits the presende 
of co-consciousness in abnormal cases, most of his attacks 
upon wftat he calls the subconscious, are valid as against 
the subconscious considered as a system of separate ideas. 
Tli re are several difficulties with this explana-
tion to be briefly noticed. 
1. How can these split off ideas effect the behavior 
of the person? In answering this the panpsychic might 
(54-r) 
answer that as such they do not; that they are only the 
psychic aspect of the real phenomena. But then we might 
ask why it is that there is no direct causal relation- • 
ship to be expressed in psychical terms, as well as in 
physical terms? This question may be answered, of course, 
but not without abandoning the strict double aspect pre-
mise • 
2. From this position it is hard to explain the 
personal or self-consciousness. There is no escape if the 
position is carried to its jbogical conclusions, from a 
asserting consciousness with every physiological func-
tioning, especially of the nerves. If each atom is pos-
sessed with consciousness, then my consciousness is 
either the consciousness of a single atom or the com-
pound of millions of minute consciousnesses. The diffi-
culty arises again when we say that some person is not 
conscious, that a blow has rendered him unconscious. 
What do th adherents of the co-conscious theory mean 
by such a statement? 
The trouble would be cleared up if they would once 
give up the a priori assumptions, t at to be psychic Is 
to be conscious. That there is a psychic factor present 
is really manifest, but there is no good reason for say-
ing that it is consciousness of split off ideas. Even 
(55-r) 
from the double aspect view there seems to he no reason 
for saying that the whole of the psychic aspect is char-
acterized by consciousness. 
3. There is also a difficulty arising form the fail-
ure to distinguish the process of thinking, the mental 
elaboration, from the contents of consciousness. 
4. In reality the split off consciousness as acconp-
anying a distinct nerve functioning, is as different 
from the ersonal consciousness of the man or woman, as 
the difference between the sub-conscious mental and the 
conscious mental of the third theory. It does no good 
to arbitrarily call all 'consciousness1 an.fi then to 
distinguish two kinds. The two instances are as differ-
ent whether we call them two kinds of consciousness or 
two kinds of mental operations. 
5. The statement of Prince that we have as much 
grounds for assuming consciousness here as in another 
individual is sound, but where are we to stop? Why then 
does he divide the subconscious into the unconscious and 
the co-conscious? Prom the panpsychist view the uncon-
scious nerve action must always be paralleled either by 
personal consciousness or co-consciousness apart from 
self consciousness. But such apparently is not the case. 
Prince (page 236 Unconscious) says of the brainless dog 
(56-r) 
or Rockmnn or of Goetz, that ,fhence it is a mindless 
physiological automaton" and (page 237) says that'fmany 
cortical processes, to be sure, are unconscious,--i.e., 
correlated with consciousness—but probably not all". 
We must give Prince credit that he endeavors to observe 
the facts and act in accord with them, his presuppos-
ition to the contrary, so wMle there may be apparent 
contradictions, yet he has worked in proper scientific 
spirit, and his conclusions are of the more value. 
In spil^of the above the co-conscious theory when 
limited to the abnormal is probably very near the truth, 
and if it postulated co-psychism, not necessarily con^c 
sciousness, we might all agree* For the abnormal phen-
omena with which Prince mostly deals, we can heartily 
agree with the following:-
"Indeed, even when there is absence of awareness 
on the part of the personal consciousness, the dissoci-
ated co-consciousness may, per contra, be aware of the 
content of the former. For this reason, if for no other, 
co-consciousness is the preferable term." (Symposium, 
Page 96). 
When the question is finally settled we can probably 
accept most of Dr. Prince fs work as applied to the mat-
erial only he has investigated * It will help finally to 
(57) 
tablish tbe subconscious in the other. 
(58) 
III* Subconscious theory. 
The third interpretation is that to which the term 
subconscious has been limited in this paper. In brief 
it states that not all mental activity Is represented 
in consciousness, that only a pafct of the process is 
represented in consciousness. The subconscious oper-
ations are going on continuously in normal as well as 
abnormal conditions. It is closely connected generally 
with' animism, vitalism or with a belief In a soul. But 
it no more drags the1 soul1 into psychology than a 
discussion of any other psychical phenemenan. Because 
some may connect sensation with a soul does not elimi-
nate the study of sensation from psychology. 
Stated thus it is hard to see why it should be the 
object of such bitter attack. It lends itself readily 
to vitalism,Amight readily be accepted by the epiphen-
omenolist, Interactionist, or parallelist. We have no 
warrant from even the materialistic standpoint, to 
say that all of the epiphenomena are characterised by 
consciousness. Many, of the operations which we call in-
tellectual may be subliminal from any point of view 
except one: that of the sensationalist who is tempte^ 
to dogmatize that all to which we may apply the term 
mental, we can also apply the term consciousness. Nor 
(59-r) 
has it any conflict with the work of Dr. Prince, except 
where Dr. Prince philosophises or where he applies the 
term conscious to the psychic factors both acknowledge 
to be present. 
Psychology will eventually have to choose whether 
it will remain psychology or become physiology or biol-
ogy. If it should choose to do the latter it will be 
of less benefit to physiology than by remaining psy-
chology. If psychology tells us nothing of real life, 
then we might as well have one set of terms as another. 
If it does tell us something, and it should, then ob-
viously the path should ̂ not be barred by any such 
assumptions as have been noted at different places in 
this paper. I wish to repeat that a psychic ether is 
as valid as any other. 
It Is a prevalent opinion in gome quarters that 
the majority of psychologists and scientists have no 
use for the subconscious. This all too true, but large-
ly because the question has not been properly under-
stood, nor gquarely faced. We need to be freed from 
our insidious network of presuppositions which are at 
present retarding the work of the psychologists. Never-
theless, many of the leading philosophers, psychologists 
and scientists of the day, believe In the subconscious 
(60-r) 
and there are may evidences that the next great move-
ment in science will be in that direction. Therefore 
I shall note something of the attitude of several 
different men, anfl endeavor while doing so to sort out 
some of the main arguments leading to the theory of the 
subconscious as being the best explanation of the three 
classes of gage not filled by consciousness. 
1. Jastrwwfs book on the "Subconscious" is-des-
criptive but greatly illuminating especially in giving 
examples of the great range of phenomena in which the 
subconscious is to be discovered. He finds a trace of the 
subconscious in nearly all mental activity, both nor-
mal and abnormal. Under normal consciousness he treats 
of absentmindedness, sunconscious doing, perceiving, 
and elaboration ("The Subconscious", Page 120)J dream 
factors in logical thinking and logical factors in 
dreaming (87), and the subconscious manuring'of thought* 
He says: "The thesis implied by such terms has two 
aspects; first that the process on assimilation may 
take place with suppressed consciousness; second, that 
the larger part of the influences that in the end 
determine our mental growth may be effective without 
direct exposure to the searching light of conscious 
life" (Subconscious, Page 99). "The associative mechan-
(61-r) 
ism finds its sphere of activity largely in the subcon-
scious realm"• (112). 
Under the abnormal come dreams, altered personali-
ties, hypnotism, hysteria, anaesthesia, automatic 
writing, crystal vision, trances, mathematical or poet-
ical prodigies. Prof. Jastrow is wary of the subliminal 
of Myers, but seems to consider consciousness and the 
subconscious as only two aspects of the same unifying 
process. He views consciousness from the functional 
(Subconscious, Page 110), and evolutionary (Symposium 
Page 42) aspect, considers the subcjnscious to be an 
arrangement for the conservation of psychic energy.n"A 
psychic moment is the resultant of a specifically in-
clined activity, reared upon a foundation of more gen-
erally conditioned influences; the subconscious 
procedures, *******form a corporate part of the psychic 
m&ment. Their presence is inherent in every ruffle in the 
stream" (420). 
Like Hoffding, Hart believes "that the history of 
all thought has been dominated throughout by as essent-
ial tendency of the human mind, the endeavor to obtain 
continuity". Like Munsterberg in his general attitude 
toward science, he asks which of the many constructions 
(62-r) 
is the most useful for the interpretation of the observ-
ed facts, but unlike Munsterberg, he believes the sub-
conscious is the best. 
He wants us to dis inguish between facts which are 
experienced and concepts which are not. Science deals 
with- experience, with the content of human mind (Sym-
posium, !!Subconscious Phenomena" Page 142), and profess-
es only to provide a"conceptual shorthand" or a "con-
ceptual model" to ennable the prediction of future oc-
currences. "Science is simply a method of conceiving 
things" (115). 
"The conception of the subconscious has devised by 
the psychologist to explain certain psychologic'1 p 
phenomena— it must be regarded as a psychological con-
ception" (123). It is an error to try to fill in the 
apparent gaps by resorting to physiology. Let each con-
struction stand by itself without borrowing from the 
other. Memory is a concept invented to explain the con-
tinued existence of an idea (123). Both ther physical 
and psychical expMnationnof memory are concepts and 
equally valid. He says that the psychic potential energy 
of an idea has as mmch scientific grounds as that mem-
ory may be explained by the potential physical energy of 
a brain cell, He makes another three-fold division of 
(3-r) 
the subconscious phenomena:1,the marginal elements of 
phenomenal consciousness,referring to Stout. 2*Dissociated 
elements of phenomenal consciousness, including the sub-
conscious of Jastrow and the co-conscious d>f Prince. 
3.The non-phenomenal construction designed to explain 
the facts of phenomenal consciousness,referring to the 
unconscious @f Freud. 
Freud is strictly deterministic in his psychology 
and assigns to the Unconscious and the Fore-conscious 
all of the psychic faotors of behavior of which we are 
not personally conscious. He divides the mental life 
into the Unconscious,which includes those unconscious 
desires apd impulses more especially connected with the 
organic or vital functions, but which of themselves 
can never reach cosciousness without a transformation; 
the fore-conscious which includes those factors which 
may or may not reach consciousness. 
Perhaps the most unique part of 'his ./psychology is 
the part assigned to the psychic censor,which stands 
between the unconscious,or the'fore-conscious, and the 
conscious. This psychic censor is a sort of private 
secretary or door-keeper to consciousness with instruc-
tions as to what &nd what not to admit to consciousness. 
(64-r) 
It has bess called a pleasure-pain principle,refusing to 
admit the unpleanant would-be intruders,including those 
unworthy ones who have gdined the disapprobation of the 
master, it is here that we find cropping tout the almost 
inevitable dualism between two aspects of life. We cannot 
ignore the processes assigned to the censor because 
the term selected to designate them unhappily sounds like 
a personificatiu . we dc turn av/ay frem certain things 
and set up permanent inhibitions against thoughts or 
actions which are extremely distasteful to us. 
Some of his followers claim that'.he has introduced a 
dynamical psychology. His theories are based on a strict 
continuity of the organic or vital processes. While he has 
gone to great extremes,yet I believe we must admit that he 
has made a very thorough and original treatment of a 
very fertile field,and I believe that he is now a sign-
post pointing to a new era in psychology. It is a work of 
too momentus importance for any psychology to ignore except 
at its peril 
McDougal in his "Psychology" discusses the following 
four classes of subconscious phenomena, under the heading 
of the supernormal,as ppposed to the sub-normal,and as 
distinct fromt the co-conscious. 
1. "Subconscious operations producing results similar 
(65) 
to those of normal thinking." This is evidenced by hyp-
nosis ,especially post-hypnotic suggestion,and by automatic 
writing. In post-hypnotic suggestiQnthe subject is told that 
ho will do a certain thing at a certain time,and is 
awakened before the time arrives but nevertheless does as 
he was told,not being able to give any reason for doing 
so, "Here then in indisputable evidence that a train 
of purposiva meeital activity,which controls to some extent 
the behavior of the subject,may go on while he is 
consciously thinking of other matters". 
2. Supernormal manifestations in the domain of intell-
ect and character including the works of genus,religious 
conversion,and mystical experience. "Whoever has made 
on the spur of the moment a witty remark will probably 
be prepared on reflection to acknowledge that the words 
sprang to his lips without any deliberate search for 
them,and that the mental processes, the assimilation 
of two seemingly unlike things,or relations,or what not, 
accomplished itself in secret,the result only coming to 
consciousness as the words Issued from the lips; and he 
may subsequently have found,somewhat to his surprise, 
that there was more in his remark than he at first 
realized", 
He believes in sudden religious experiences that 
the good seed has been sown and has ripened in secret, 
and that such experiences are generally preceded by a 
(GG) 
period of roll pious longimg or unrest, which has produced, 
an unconscious conative tendency. 
3. "Supernormal influence of the mind over the body? 
Here he says that "the Effects of hypnotic suggestion 
provide the one sure evidence that mental influences upon 
the bodily processes may" go far beyond the normal or 
the ordinarily recognized*-, 
wr" * 
4. Supernormal processes of communication between mind 
and mind. For telepathy he says that "the evidence—would 
sufficc to establish the fact in dispute for all normal 
minds were it not that the question is of such momentus 
importance7but pleads for suspended judgement• "Empirical 
support for the belief in the communication with the di-
vine mind is sought along two lines chiefly. First it is 
argued that the processes of religious conversion is often 
one that cannot be accounted In terms of the known 
properties of the human mind in general and of the mental 
peculiarities of the persons concerned.Secondly,it is 
^oirted out that in all ages the specifically religious 
experiences of men brought up under the most diverse 
trad It ions,have certain features in common which mark 
them as the work of a common influence and point to their 
determination from a common source". Referring to William 
James, whe suggested that we may regard a 1 minds as com«< 
nected in some immediate fashion which permits of their 
reciprocal* influence and of the conjunction of their 
(G7) 
powers;that all nind,human and infra-human as well as 
super-human mind, is one and that our individual minds 
ore b it partial manifestations of the one mind,conditioned 
by the peculiarities of our bodily organisms*. 
Whatever oura attitude toward this it reveals a 
tendency of thought which is also exhibited when Dr.G.S. 
Pall says that probably much of the impetus toward the 
study of astrology and astronomy is on account of "an 
unconscious orientation of the mind towards its pris-
tine and also its ultimate home", the'only difference 
being in t e nature of that ultimate home, and in its 
relation to our individual minds, Mankind feels that 
there is some relation,but whatever it is it works 
subconsciously is us. Hoffding defines religion as a 
"cosmic 1 vital feeling". 
This brings up the question of man's relation to the 
universe. We can hardly deny that there may be many 
cosmicol forces which determine our behavior,or our 
experiences,the sources and the nature of which is 
beyond our comprehension. It may not make very much 
difference whether we call it physical or psychical. 
*7hile I am not trying to argue either way on the question 
of telepathy,yet I hardly see how the most thorough 
mechanistic interpretation of life can deny its possibility. 
If molecular vibrations which are physical can produce 
a sensation of smell, why is telepathy impossible? 
(68) 
For mind is here considered on a mechanical basis. If 
mind or consciousness is the product of the impressions 
of different vibrations in the air or ether, how can we 
be sure that we know all these vibrations or the causes 
back of them? But there is a tremendous gap between the 
vibrjtions and the sensations. 
So if we carry mechanical principles over into the 
mental fcoalm we cannot deny the possibility of telepathy. 
But if we holt In in the application of the physical 
explanation when we com to the conscious sensation, 
then other factors must enter which lie beyond the scope 
of physics, and we can hardly fall back on physics to 
say what may and what may not take place in this sofcfaer 
realm. Physics cannot therefore determine the influences 
or the activities d>f anyesint, of a principle in this 
realm. Obviously then on this second of the two alter-
natives, physics has nothing to say as to the activities 
or the inter-relationships in this psychic or spiritual 
unLverse. 
In either case then physics cannot deny the possi-
bility of telepathy. Of cousre this does not prove the 
fact of its existence. 
The work and influence is in support of the sub-
conscious interpretation,although he uses the term 
"Unconscious". Fe says;?,To explore the sacred depths 
(69) 
of the Unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the 
subsoil of consciousness,that vrill be the principle task of 
psychology in the century which is opening. I do not doubt 
that wonderful discoveries await it there, as important, 
perhaps as have been in the preceding centuries the diccov-
eries of the physical and natural sciences".(The bifcth of 
the dream,Independent,Oct 30,1913.) 
In"Matter and Memory- he says that "our unwillingness 
to conceive unconscious mental states is due,above all,to 
the fact that we hold consciousness to be the essential 
property of psychical states:so that a psychical state 
cannot,it seems, cease to be conscious without ceasing to 
exist. But if consciousness be but the characteristic note 
of the present,that is to say of the actually lived,in 
short of the active, then that which does not act may cease 
to belong to consciousness,without therefore ceasing to 
exist in some manner. In other words,in the psychological 
domain,consciousness may not be the synonym of existence, 
but only of real action or ofl immediate efficacy"(pg 181). 
One of the reasons for this position is thatwthere 
will no longer be ony more reason to say that the past 
* 
effaces itself as soon as perceived,than to suppose that 
material objects cease to exist when we perceive them"(182). 
Also; "the Idea of an unconscious representation is clear, 
despite current prejudicesjwe may even say that we make 
constant use of it, and that there is no conception more 
(70) 
familiar ro common sense.For everyone admits that the 
images actually present to our perception are not the whole 
of the matter? (183). "Row comes it then that an existence 
outside of consciousness appears clear to us in the case 
of objects,but obscure when we are speaking of the subject? 
Our percept ions,actual and virtual,extend along two lines, 
the one horozontal,AB, which contains all simultaneous 
objects in space, the other vertical,CL, on which are 
ranged our successive recolloctions set out in time. The 
point I nt the intersection of the two lines, is the only 
one actually given to consciousness. Whence comes it that 
we do not hesitate to posit the reality of the whole line 
ABfalthough it remains unperceived, while,on the contrary, 
of the line CI, the present I which is actually perceived 
is the only one which appears to us really to exist"? We 
are not here concerned with the answer to this question, 
but it is enough to note that for Bergson the whole of 
the one line is as real as the other.Practically the whole 
of Bergson*s treatment of memory depends on the existence 
of Q subconscious (unconscious) mental existence. 
The work of the Vitalists is in harmony with the 
subconscious position. The subconscious theory will likely 
be accepted by all those who believe that they are some-
thing more than a molecular machine. McDougal's whole 
arrunent for 'Animism* inwBdy and Mind" is an argument for 
the subconscious* 
(7-r) 
There is no need to do more than refer to the familiar 
arguments from the effects upon "behavior or upon ideas "by 
subliminal stimuli, or the familiar discussion of marginal 
consciousness, nor the proofs offered for the existence 
of subliminal sensations as presented by Fechner and others. 
A more complete list of those men whose influence is 
favorable to 1be subconscious interpretation, would would 
include William James, James Ward, Sir Oliver Lodge, Binet, 
Cidis ,and Dr.Schofield. 
The End 
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